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Happiness is discovering that an explanation I didn’t have time to give in my other
session can be used in this session. My other session is about question begging
Originally, I think, the idea of question begging arose as follows. I want to give an
argument, the intended argument, but that argument is invalid. So I express the argument
ambiguously so it appears to be the same as a valid argument which, in turn, appears to
be the intended argument. But the valid argument is actually different. Either one of the
premises is different, and so question begging or the conclusion is different, an irrelevant
conclusion.
However Aristotle presents the idea wrongly, so that the invalidity, the ambiguity,
and the question begging or irrelevant conclusion, instead of being several faults within a
single fallacy, all appear to be separate items.
So if question begging is separate, what makes a premise question begging if
there is no intended argument to refer to? And the answer comes back that question
begging occurs when you use as a premise a statement you’re not entitled to use as a
premise. And the next question is: what kind of statement are you entitled to use as a
premise?
Different answers to this question may lead to different theories of question
begging. However the most general answer is that it all depends on the purpose of giving
the argument.
For example, if I want to decide some question I will argue from things I believe.
If I already believe something but want to be surer, I will argue from things I am surer
about. If I want to cause an audience to know something, I will argue from things they
already know. If I want to sell an audience a snake oil conclusion by hook or by crook, I
will argue from all of their beliefs, however foolish I think them. If I want to refute a
theory by reductio, I argue from statements of that theory and to a contradiction. In
conditional proof, I argue from the antecedent to the consequent. If I want to cite
Aristotle as my ally, I will argue from statements of Aristotle to my view. If I want to say
that your view puts you in a league with the terrible Hegel, I may derive your view from
statements of Hegel. Or some teacher may just have assigned a class of statements that I
am permitted to argue from.
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So in any of these cases, I beg the question if I use as a premise a statement which
isn’t in the class I’m supposed to be arguing from and hasn’t been previously derived
from that class.
So here, motivated by questions about question begging, I’ve developed a theory
about arguments being given for purposes and those purposes determining what
statements are suitable as premises in those arguments.
When I turn to Pinto’s paper, my first impression is that, for different motives, he
has developed the same theory.
But before we consider that, let us note one further feature of my theory. In my
theory, an argument is to a conclusion but it is not necessarily being given for that
conclusion. When in reductio, I argue to a contradiction, I am not arguing for the
contradiction, but for the falsity of the premise. In conditional proof, I argue to the
consequent but for the conditional. In arguing from Hegel to your view, I’m not arguing
for your view, I’m trying bring your view into ill repute.
The case of arguing from an audience’s foolish opinions to my snake oil
conclusion needs a little discussion. In a sense the argument is for its conclusion, for that
is the very conclusion I’m trying to sell. But I myself do not take the argument as giving
any reason—good reason—for its conclusion. I shall say the argument is for no
conclusions but is for a purpose—that of selling its conclusion to an audience.
So in my view an argument is to a conclusion but may not be for it.
In turning to Pinto, my first impression is that his theory and mine are the same.
He distinguishes between believing that p and accepting that p. Accepting that p, in a
context, means accepting p as a suitable premise for use in that context. You can believe
that p and yet not accept p. You can accept p even though you think it is false.
Acceptance varies from context to context even when beliefs remain unchanged. It sure
sounds as if Pinto’s theory and mine are the same.
I first began to doubt this because of a footnote, although partly, I saw later,
because I misread that footnote. The footnote really does say that some remarks Pinto
made above help explain how we can sometimes believe p without accepting p. This
puzzled me slightly, because in my theory that hardly needs explaining. If, for instance,
I’m arguing from your opinions, what I believe cuts no ice, and would generally be
question begging. But then the footnote seemed to say, but didn’t say, something that
would be crazy on my view. It seemed to say that if in a situation I can accept that p, then
in that situation I’m entitled to act on p. Of course, that would be absurd. Just because I
assume for reductio that people can jump out of windows and fly, doesn’t mean I should
go ahead and try this trick! But, for the record, what Pinto really said was that if I’m
deciding what to do and will act upon the conclusion of the argument, then I’d better
stick to the premises I’m entitled to act upon.
Anyway, I began to feel that I was depending too much on abstract formulations
of Pinto’s theory and needed more concrete examples. Turning to an appendix I found
three examples of accepting that p. One involves arguing from things I believe; another,
from things that are very strongly established and widely accepted, and, in the third, I
argue from a premise that isn’t strictly true but is true enough for my purposes.
In all these examples, the premise accepted is either believed or well established
or believed at least roughly. I begin to suspect that, for Pinto, acceptance presupposes
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belief, at least roughly. And note, in all these cases, the argument would be for the
conclusion. What does Pinto include under argument?
On this suspicion, Pinto’s statement that one can accept p sometimes even while
believing that p is false would mean only that sometimes you can believe p is true enough
even though you don’t believe it’s exactly true.
I return to the paper, with this suspicion, looking for more examples of
acceptance.
Unqualified belief or acceptance that p presupposes that I believe that there is no
serious possibility that p is false. So, I take it, unqualified acceptance that p presupposes
unqualified belief that p.
But under qualified belief and acceptance, we find two examples of qualified
acceptance, that don’t presuppose even qualified belief.
Qualified belief means I believe p on the basis of its probability, which, though
not enough for certainty, is enough for believing p.
One example of qualified acceptance is that of real possibility. I qualifiedly
believe not p; so there is a real possibility that I am wrong and that p. I argue: p, therefore
q. The argument to q argues for the real possibility of q. The premise p is accepted as
premise but not believed. Note, however, in this example, p and q are positively
characterized as real possibilities.
Another example is that of presuming that p. Suppose the following simple
account explains the presumption of innocence. I’m in the jury box. I have heard no
evidence. But I believe the prosecution has evidence that shows the defendant is guilty,
and I believe I am about to hear that evidence. And I believe that the defendant is guilty.
Of course, I also think these beliefs could be wrong. But if I hear that evidence and, to my
surprise, it does not show the guilt, I will believe the defendant is innocent. And I believe
now, at the beginning of the trial, that if the evidence does not show the defendant is
guilty, the defendant is innocent. And this belief is, on this account, the presumption of
innocence.
But now if I accept that he’s innocent and infer he should be set free, my
argument to the conclusion he should be set free is really for the conclusion that if the
evidence doesn’t show guilt, he should be set free. And the premise that he is innocent is
accepted as a premise but is not believed.
So again my suspicion is not right. But, again, the example is one where
something positive, that they should be presumed, is being said about both premise and
conclusion.
So now I wonder, maybe something like my suspicion is true. Maybe some of the
various purposes to be served by his very general theory makes Pinto reluctant to go too
far from the narrower arguments for a conclusion all the way to arguments to a
conclusion. Why aren’t there really negative examples, where the arguer detests the
premise and conclusion? Why not arguments from Hegel, for reductio, and from the
foolish to the snake oil? Or purely neutral ones, as from antecedent to consequent?
I now turn briefly to a different point. There is some unclarity in Pinto’s paper
about what he calls expecting p. “Probably p” expresses that I expect p. But is expecting a
species of qualified acceptance that presupposes qualified belief, or is it just qualified
belief itself, not requiring acceptance? I think it is just qualified belief. For it is possible
to believe p on its probability and yet find that probability not high enough for one’s
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argument. Then one would say, “Probably p but not probably enough for this argument,”
and one would not say, “I believe p but can’t say probably p.”
One final warning about Pinto’s phrase “accepting that p.” Sellars 1 used this to
mean, essentially “believing.” Pinto has shortened the ordinary phrase “accepting that p
for the sake of the argument.” This can lead to strange ways of speaking. I say to my
opponent, “I accept the complete truth of your theory. Of course, only for purposes of
reductio. Of course, I don’t accept your theory without qualification, but only with a
qualification. The comedian’s qualification ‘NOT!’”
Afterword (Not read at session, but sent to Pinto.)
After writing the above comment, I began to worry that I was being unfair to Pinto.
Maybe his abstract formulations show clearly that his concept of arguments is the full
“to” concept even though his examples haven’t caught up. I was thinking particularly of a
very general sounding account of reasoning.
But then I realized that account actually proves my suspicion is not all wrong.
Pinto defines, “In my view, reasoning is a matter of grounding or anchoring my
propositional attitude toward some propositional content…in my attitudes toward certain
other propositional content.”
But note, on this account a premise is accepted because of my propositional
attitude towards it. Where are Hegel’s views, the audience’s views, and the contents of a
theory I’m trying to refute? Not to mention, statements assigned by my teacher.
link to response

link to paper

1

In the passage that Pinto cites from Sellars, W. (1964) Induction as Vindication. Philosophy of Science,
31, 197-231, p.198.
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